Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1954

Leonard Black and Vera Johnson v. David F.
Anderson : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister; Walter L. Budge; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Black v. Anderson, No. 8234 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2257

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.J

OFr. .3

1954

L.: , .UA,
U. of U.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LEONARD BLACK and VERA JOHNSON, also known as Vera Johnson
Black,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.

vs.

8234

DAVID F. ANDERSON, Judge of the
Juvenile Court of Washington County,
State of Utah, et al.,
,.,.
Defendants and Appella'lfl,ts.

.LED
· - - - - - - - - - - - - · · · · - - _ _ _ _ ............. 1

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

·
Cot.tt"'::., U;..u;,
.me

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Appellants.

ARROW PA!88, SALT LAKI

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS

5

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THE JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE
COURT NULL AND VOID AS IN VIOLATION OF AMENDMENTS ONE AND FOURTEEN OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF
ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH . . . . . . . . . .
.......

6

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS TO
SUBJECT MATTER RELATING TO FITNESS OF PARENTS TO HAVE CUSTODY
OF CHILDREN

7

CONCLUSION .

...........

11

AUTHORITIES CITED

United States Constitution, Amendments One and
Four

5

Constitution of Utah, Article I

5

Utah Code Annotated 1953:
55-10-5

7

55-10-5 (3)

.... 9,10

55-10-5 ( 4)

... 8, 10

55-10-34

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Page
CASES CITED

Chapman v. Graham, _Utah _ , 270 P. 2d 821

7, 9

Ex Parte S. H., _Utah _ , 264 P. 2d 850 .

7

Jensen v. Sevy, 103 Utah 220, 134 P. 2d 1081

8, 9

Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191, 193

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LEONARD BLACK and VERA JOHNSON, also known as Vera Johnson
Black,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
8234

DAVID F. ANDERSON, Judge of the
Juvenile Court of Washington County,
State of Utah, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Vera Johnson also known as Vera Johnson Black is the
polygamous wife of Leonard Black and from this unlawful
relationship there have been born eight children ranging,
now, from eighteen to two years of age. Subsequent to the
so-called "Short Creek Raid" by Arizona State authorities,
these children, the eldest being seventeen years of age,
were declared and adjudged in juvenile court to be neglected
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children within the meaning of the laws of Utah (R. 7).
That court held, in part:
"That the home of Leonard Black and Vera
Johnson Black at Short Creek, Utah, is an immoral
environment for the rearing of said children.
"That Leonard Black, the father, and Vera
Johnson Black, the mother of said children, have
each knowingly failed and neglected to provide for
said children the proper maintenance, care, training
and education contemplated and required by both
law and morals.
"That both the public welfare and the welfare
of the children requires that the rights of custody
and control over said children be taken from their
parents" (R. 13, 14).
The parents, above referred to, were thereupon deprived
of their custody and control over said children and the
children made wards of the juvenile court and subjected to
the continuing jurisdiction of that court. The right of
custody and control over said ch'ildren was awarded to the
Utah State Department of Public Welfare, said department being authorized and instructed to place the children
in suitable foster homes; provided, however:

"* * * that said children may remain in
the actual custody of their parents upon the following conditions, and only upon said conditions, to-wit:
"(a) That the parents and each of them shall
at all times comply with the laws of Utah relating
to marriage and sexual offenses.
"(b) That the parents and each of them shall
at all times refrain from counseling, encouraging
and advising the children to violate the laws of
Utah relating to marriage and sexual offenses.
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"(c) That the parents and each of them shall
counsel and advise the children to obey the laws of
Utah relating to marriage and sexual offenses. This
requirement shall not be satisfied by the pretense of
telling the children that they have 'free agency', but
it is intended that the parents shall affirmatively
encourage their children to abide by the laws of
Utah, and that the children should do so in disregard to any religious doctrines to the contrary.

* * *"

(R. 8).

Of the above recited conditions the parents complained by
writ of habeas corpus, issued out of this Honorable Court
and made returnable before the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable William Stanley Dunford presiding. There were other
matters raised in the complaint for said writ but with
which, in this cause, we are not concerned. This appeal is
being taken solely for the purpose of determining what the
law is, in this State, as to the matters subject to review
or collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings.
There is now in process an appeal from the ruling of
the juvenile court in this cause which will concern itself
with all other issues of which these respondents complain.
Your appellants here seek only this Court's guidance in the
handling of similar cases, with which the juvenile courts
of this State are now faced or in which they may hereinafter become involved. The Honorable Judge of the Fourth
Judicial District ordered, adjudged and decreed :
"(a) That the judgment of the Juvenile Court
of 'Vashington County, State of Utah, made and
entered on or about the 11th day of May, 1954, is
null and void as in violation of the Amendments
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One and Fourteen of the Constitution of the United
States of America, and in violation of Sections 1-4-7
of Article One of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, and in derogation of the plaintiffs' rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
" (b) That the custody of the children of the
plaintiffs is hereby restored to their parents, the
plaintiffs, upon the conditions, pending the appeal
of the above entitled case, that the parents do not
live together as man and wife, that they retain the
custody of the children within the geographic bounds
of the State of Utah and return them to this court
or to any other court which may have jurisdiction
at any time that they are ordered by said court to
do so" (R. 45, 46).
We concede that the writ of habeas corpus did lie and was
properly made returnable before the district court and
further that that court could properly consider and adjudicate the legality of the restraint. However, we think that
the district court did err, after having considered the
legality of the restraint and ruled thereupon, by proceeding
thereafter to adjudicate questions going to the qualifica·tions and fitness of the parents to retain custody of their
children. Counsel for defendants made objection to this
collateral attack and review of the findings of the juvenile
court (R. 25, 26), and we here renew that objection. We
complain of that portion of the findings of fact of the
district court, made as follows:

*

*

*

*

*

"7. That the plaintiffs and parents of the said
children, Leonard Black and Vera Johnson Black,
are with the single exception of the alleged practice
of plural marriage, people of high moral character
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and integrity, and that the community in which they
live is void from many of the evils that beset more
populous communities such as smoking, drinking,
divorce, unemployment, juvenile vandalism, thievery
and juvenile delinquency and that it is for the best
interest of the said children to be in their homes at
Short Creek under the custody of their parents, the
plaintiffs in the above entitled action" (R. 43).

*

*

*

*

*

for the reason and upon the ground that such a finding
was made upon matters reviewable upon appeal from the
order of the juvenile court, but not subject to review or
collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings.
It would serve no useful purpose to recite the facts
presented to the Fourth Judicial District Court. We confine ourselves to the principle of law involved and need not
impose upon this Court the onerous task of studying the
transcript.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT
NULL AND VOID AS IN VIOLATION OF
AMENDMENTS ONE AND FOURTEEN OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND OF ARTICLE
ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING IN
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS TO SUBJECT
MATTER RELATING TO FITNESS OF PARENTS TO HAVE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT
NULL AND VOID AS IN VIOLATION OF
AMENDMENTS ONE AND FOURTEEN OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND OF ARTICLE
ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
A companion case pending before this Honorable Court,
titled "State of Utah, In the Interest of Elsie Johnson
Black, et al.," seeks an adjudication of the constitutionality
of the judgment of the juvenile court as declared void in
the proceedings from which we here appeal. Therefore,
appellants request the Court's permission to waive argument on this Point I for the reason that the said companion
case will. resolve that issue.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING IN
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS TO SUBJECT
MATTER RELATING TO FITNESS OF PARENTS TO HAVE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.
The Utah statute, 55-10-5, U. C. A. 1953, provides in
part:
"The juvenile court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, dependency and delinquency of children who are under eighteen years of age, * * * "
And, also:
"Nothing herein contained shall deprive other
courts of the right to determine the custody of children upon writs of habeas corpus, * * * "
Section 55-10-34, U. C. A. 1953, makes a final judgment or
order of the juvenile court depriving a parent, custodian
or guardian of the custody of a child appealable direct to
the Supreme Court; and, this Court has held that matters
reviewable on appeal, but which do not go to the juvenile
court's jurisdiction are not subject to review or collateral
attack in habeas corpus proceedings. Ex Parte S. H., ..
Utah
, 264 P. 2d 850. Our Court has also held:
"In habeas Corpus proceedings, nothing is inquired into except the legality of the restraint."

Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191, 193.
Chapman v. Graham,
Utah ... , 270 P. 2d
821.
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From the case of Jensen v. Sevy, 103 Utah 220, 134
P. 2d 1081, confusion, if any there be, springs. That cause
was before this Court on an application for writ of mandamus to compel the district judge to hold a hearing on a
writ of habeas corpus in a child custody case. An alternative writ issued directing the court to hold such hearing,
or to show cause why he did not do so. The court below
filed an answer joining issue to show cause and justify.
It was the conclusion and order of the district court that
that court was without jurisdiction or authority to hear
or consider the writ of habeas corpus or to make any determination therein with reference to the custody of the
child. The opinion of Mr. Justice Larson, concurred in by
Justice Moffat, holds, as the writer interprets that holding,
that the district court could decline to pass upon questions
of custody and leave the same for determination by the
juvenile court under that portion of Section 55-10-5{4),
U. C. A. 1953, which provides:

"* * * Such other courts may, however, decline to pass upon question of custody and may certify the same to the juvenile court for hearing and
determination or recommendation."
This leaves, by inference at least, the proposition that the
district court might, within the exercise of its discretion,
hear, consider, review and determine matters of custody
theretofore decreed upon by the juvenile court. In the case
at bar, the Honorable Judge William Stanley Dunford so
proceeded, pointing out in his memorandum decision that
three judges in concurring opinions held, in Jensen v. Sevy,
supra, that where the juvenile court has obtained jurisdiction of a child because of neglect, dependency or delin-
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quency, the district court must dismiss the writ and it is
not discretionary, but distinguishing that case from the
case at bar for the reason that the petitioner there had
not exhausted his legal remedy by seeking modification of
the conditional order of the juvenile court (R. 25, 26).
Let us again reiterate that we are not here complaining of the holding of the district court as to legality of the
restraint, although we do not admit that such was not
error. We contend that the finding as to the illegality of
the restraint entitled the petitioners only to the relief
sought within the scope of habeas corpus-the discharge
of the children from custody. Such discharge of the children
could have been made conditional by the court, either upon
review of the holding of the district court or upon the outcome of an appeal from the finding, as to neglect, of the
juvenile court. Chapman v. Graham, supra. However, we
earnestly urge that further findings should not have been
made, nor order thereon issued, depriving the juvenile court
of its continuing jurisdiction over the children previously
acquired by that court under authority of Section 55-105 (3), U. C. A. 1953.
The case of Jensen v. Sevy, supra, also sustains the
following propositions:
(A) That the Legislature has the power to give to
the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction of cases of neglect
or delinquency of children.
(B) That the right to the writ of habeas corpus is
in no way infringed by legislation giving the juvenile court
exclusive jurisdiction of cases of neglect or delinquency of
children.
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(C) That subsection ( 4), 55-10-5, U. C. A. 1953, cannot be construed to apply to cases in which the State has
become a party by intervention of the juvenile court.
As to (C) above, Mr. Justice Hoyt said :

"* * * To hold
reason of subsection
courts have concurrent
ile courts in cases of

otherwise is to hold that by
( 4) * * * the district
jurisdiction with the juvenalleged neglect of children.

* * *"
Appellants here contend that if subsection ( 4) of 55-10-5,
U. C. A. 1953, is to be construed as being applicable to the
case at bar, the result of such construction would be the
emasculation of subsection (3) of that statute, which provides:
"When jurisdiction shall have been acquired by
the court in the case of any child, such child shall
continue for the purposes of such case under the
jurisdiction of the court until he becomes twentyone years of age, unless discharged prior thereto or
unless he is committed to the state industrial school
or to the district court as hereinafter provided."
Therefore, the question presented here resolves itself to
this-and we ask the Court:

On the writ of habeas corpus may the district
court, after disposing of any question of the legality
of the restraint of a neglected, dependent or delinquent child, disturb the previously acquired jurisdiction of the juvenile court by considering questions
of fitness and custody of a parent or guardian of
such a child which are reviewable on appeal to the
Supreme Court, but which do not go to the juvenile
court's jurisdiction and are not subject to review or
collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings?
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CONCLUSION
Our Legislature, in its wisdom, has for all practical
purposes conferred parental powers and duties upon the
juvenile courts of this State over neglected, dependent or
delinquent children. There have been vested no such responsibilities upon the district courts of this State. We
think it now well settled in this State that if the juvenile
court has jurisdiction in the premises, its judgment, order,
or decree is final as to all parties to the proceedings, is
not subject to collateral attack, and cannot be challenged
except in a direct action brought in some appellate tribunal.
Therefore, in the case at bar, it may not be successfully
contended that the district court could utilize the writ of
habeas corpus for the purpose of proceedings in error.
There is no doubt in our mind that had there been no question raised as to the legality of the restraint of these children, the Honorable Court below would have dismissed the
writ; and done so upon the ground that the issues raised
(as to the parents' fitness, right to custody, neglect, delinquency, etc.) were not subject to review in habeas corpus
proceedings. That is the well established law of this State.
For what reason then should the district court review
such factual matters in this case? Did such review accomplish a desired result? We think not. Sufficient it
would have been for the district court to have confined its
findings to the issues raised within the scope of habeas
corpus. As the record in the cause now stands, we have
conflicting findings made by the juvenile court and by the
district court, neither of which are final, which tend only
to confuse the real issue as to the right to custody of these
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children. That issue can only be determined through appropriate appeal to this Court. The question as to the
legality of the restraint, on jurisdictional or constitutional
grounds, is in no way related to the matters appealable
directly from the juvenile court to this Honorable Court.
Should we concede, for the purpose of argument, but not
admitting the fact, that the restraint was unlawful, would
not the discharge of the children sought by the petitioners
for the writ, conditional or unconditional, have accomplished the object of, and satisfied the purpose of, the writ
of habeas corpus. We so conclude.
The findings of the district court as to whether or
not the persons subject to the proceedings in the juvenile
court were neglected children within the meaning of the
laws of Utah should be set aside and held for naught.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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